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THE FUTURE OF RACIAL REDISTRICTING IN VOTING:
CLARK V. CALHOUN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI.'
Paul H. Dickerson*
INTRODUCTION
Recent high-profile lawsuits involving The University of Texas
at Austin's law school admissions program, Mark Fuhrman's guilt or
innocence for perjury, and Texaco's employment practices, each
contained racial decisions which inflamed and divided the nation.2
* J.D. candidate, 1998, South Texas College of Law. Upon graduation, the author
will begin a two-year law clerk position with United States Magistrate Judge
Marcia Crone. During the year 2000, the author will commence work as an
associate with Haynes and Boone, L.L.P. The author wishes to thank the following
individuals for their assistance in preparing this article: Clifton, Linda, and James
Dickerson; Tricia Wright; John Bauman; Randall Kelso; Elizabeth Dennis; John
Barnes; and Beth Neu.
88 F.3d 1393 (5th Cir. 1996).
2 In Hopwoodv. Texas, Sheryl Hopwood, along with three other white students,
sued The University of Texas at Austin Law School for reverse discrimination after
being denied admission. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996). The admissions plan considered white and minority applicants on separate
tracks, in order to increase the number of minority students admitted. Hopwood, 78
F.3d at 936-37. The Hopwoodruling, which found this approach unacceptable, held
that the school could no longer use race as a factor in admissions. Id. at 962.
In People v. Simpson, O.J. Simpson was charged with the brutal murders of his
estranged white wife and a local white waiter. No. BA-097211 (Super. Ct. Los
Angeles Cty., Oct. 3, 1995); see Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post
Conviction Defense Organizations As a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA.
L. REv. 863, 875 (1996). Following his testimony in O.J. Simpson's trial, Mark
Fuhrman was given three years probation and a $200 fine after pleading no contest
to perjury for denying under oath that he had not used the word "nigger" in ten
years. See V. Dion Haynes, Fuhrman Bargains Out of Jail Time: Facing Perjury
Charge, He Gets Three Year Probation, CmI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1996, at 3. Mark
Fuhrman was a Los Angeles county police detective who allegedly found a bloody
glove at the Simpson estate matching one found at the deceased's estate. The Big
Story, (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 20, 1995).
In 1994, four employees of Texaco Inc. met in private at the company's White
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The decisions exemplify the fact that no matter what the issue, race-
based decisions are guaranteed a hearty debate. Affirmative action is
no exception. Affirmative action attempts to balance past and present
racial inequities by producing a level playing field for minority and
non-minority competition.3 Like all other race-based issues, the
creation of affirmative action led to concerns about the appropriate
balance needed to level the field.4 The Supreme Court provided a
constitutional answer to these concerns in 1995 when it stated that
race-based affirmative action programs must be analyzed under strict
scrutiny.' In other words, the programs must serve a compelling
governmental interest and be the least restrictive alternative.
When Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, it was clear that
Congress was concerned about discrimination in state-drawn voting
districts.6 Pursuant to this Act, any state wanting to redraw its districts
Plains, N.Y., headquarters to discuss some personnel documents that had been
requested in a race discrimination lawsuit. Sharon Walsh, Destroying Documents
and Legal Defenses; Experts Say Texaco Points Up How Shredders Can Come
Back to Haunt Companies, WASH. POST., Jan. 26, 1997. The company's treasurer
was heard on a tape recording of the meeting saying that "[w]e're going to purge
the [expletive] out of these books.... We're not going to have any [expletive]
thing that.., we don't need to be in them." ld. Texaco agreed to pay $176.1
million to approximately 1,400 current and former black employees to end a race-
discrimination suit. Allanna Sullivan, EEOC, Texaco and Plaintiffs' Lamyers Seek
to End Differences Over Settlement, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1996, at B5.
3 See BLACK'S LAw DICIoNARY 59 (6th ed. 1990) (defining affirmative action
programs as, "positive steps designed to eliminate existing and continuing
discrimination, to remedy lingering effects of past discrimination, and to create
systems and procedures to prevent future discrimination").
' See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,630-31 (1991)
("If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must
recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and
causes continued hurt and injury.").
' See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995) (holding that "all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor,
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny").




must submit the state's proposal to the Justice Department for
approval.7 Approval, however, did not shield the redistricting plan
from subsequent attack.' The creation of the Voting Rights Act
sparked the related issue of whether compliance with the Voting
Rights Act served a compelling governmental interest. For, if
compliance with the Voting Rights Act is a compelling interest, the
state, assuming it chose the least restrictive alternative, would be
allowed to use race as a factor in designing its districts.'
The Fifth Circuit answered the compelling interest question in
Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss., in holding that Calhoun County,
Mississippi's 1990 redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act.'0
Through analyzing two recent Supreme Court opinions, the circuit
court found that compliance with the Voting Rights Act was a
compelling interest. Equally compelling was the Supreme Court's
Section 5 [of the Voting Rights Act] was a response to a
common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead
of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws
as soon as the old ones had been struck down. That practice had
been possible because each new law remained in effect until the
Justice Department or private plaintiffs were able to sustain the
burden of proving that the new law, too, was discriminatory...
.Congress therefore decided, as the Supreme Court held it could,
to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators
of the evil to its victim, by freezing election procedures in the
covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be
nondiscriminatory.
Id. (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (internal citations
omitted)).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1965) (stating that any alteration of voting
qualification or procedure should not have the purpose or effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color).
8 Id.
9 As discussed in Part IV of this Note, the Supreme Court's recent move to
"watered-down" strict scrutiny of race-based redistricting does not require the least
restrictive alternative.
"0 Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss., 88 F.3d 1393, 1400 (5th Cir. 1996).
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application of a new level of scrutiny, "watered-down"" strict
scrutiny, to affirmative action redistricting programs. Although the
Supreme Court continues to apply "traditional" strict scrutiny to other
race-based affirmative action programs, the Court now applies less
scrutiny to racially drawn voting districts.
This Note analyzes the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Clark and
provides additional support for the identification of the Supreme
Court's new scrutiny of race-based redistricting. Part I of this Note
provides the factual and procedural background of Clark. Part II
focuses on the Fifth Circuit's holding that Calhoun County's
redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act. Part III tracks the
Fifth Circuit's analysis of two recent Supreme Court opinions
concerning the constitutionality of affirmative action in redistricting
and identifies the new compelling interest. Part IV explains the
concept of "watered-down" strict scrutiny and supports the
conclusion that the Supreme Court has moved to a lesser "watered-
down" strict scrutiny of affirmative action in redistricting. The Fifth
Circuit's findings, coupled with the Supreme Court's recent move to
"watered-down" strict scrutiny, should ensure continued use of race
as a factor in voter redistricting.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following the release of the 1990 census, Calhoun County,
Mississippi's Board of Supervisors hired a consulting group to
develop a redistricting plan that reflected the population changes in
the county. 2 In addition, the Board appointed a biracial committee
" Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
12 Id at 1394. According to the 1990 census, black residents comprise 23% of the
county's voting age population and 27% of its population overall. Id. at 1395. The
County experienced an overall decrease in population of 736 people, but a 1.52%
increase in the black population from 1980 and a 1.52% decrease in the white
population. Clark v. Calhoun County, 813 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (N.D. Miss. 1993).
The redistricting plan divided Calhoun County's black population "roughly
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made up of one black resident and one white resident from each
election district to supervise the consultant's work.13 This biracial
committee approved one of the consultant's redistricting proposals,
and the Board formally adopted it after a public hearing.14 Pursuant
to the Voting Rights Act, the Department of Justice subsequently
precleared the proposed redistricting plan. 5
James Clark and Barbara Brown (collectively "Clark") were
black residents and registered voters in Calhoun County. Clark sued
Calhoun County, the Calhoun County Democratic Executive
Committee, the Calhoun County Republican Executive Committee,
and the Calhoun County Election Commission (collectively "Calhoun
County"), alleging that Calhoun County's redistricting plan violated
equaly!among [it] ffve districts, rangi&g~from a low of19°%of iie-opiulation in
Lone distriLt] tor aiiglr of 42 1. i wanother district]." "Ibrk; 881 F.3dat. 195.. The
BoarofSiiperi~orsrequested~that~the-onsultants consd~trtih'fdll6Wing1iteria
in its redfstrictiig: (1) "[i]f at all'possible, the population deviation shouldb'ulieleld,
to 5% or less",(2) "[t]he votingstrength of all minorities within the County shotill'
be consideed so as not to~dilutetheir present strength and/or to 'pack' any one
district in order't dilute teloverall minority voting strength"; (3) "[i]f possible,
no incumbent superviior should be placed in a district with another incumbent
supervisor"; (4) "[t]he present voting precincts should be maintained if at all
possible"; and (5) "[t]he separate bonded indebtedness of Districts 1 and 4 should
be considered in order to minimize taxing districts and confusion." Clark, 813 F.
Supp. at 1192.
Clark was one of several redistricting cases litigated after the 1990 census. Id.
at 1189; See generally Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1950 (1996) ("This is the
latest in a series of appeals involving racial gerrymandering challenges to state
redistricting efforts in the wake of the 1990 census."); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct.
1894 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw II]; United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995);
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
[hereinafter Shaw 1].
13 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1394.
14 Id. at 1394-95.
t1 Id at 1402. Justice Department pre-clearance does not prevent subsequent
attack. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1982).
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Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 6 Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act prohibits any voting practice or procedure that "results in a denial
or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color." 7 Clark claimed the redistricting plan
resulted in a dilution of the minority vote in Calhoun County, thus
violating Section 2.
After a bench trial, the District Court granted judgment to
Calhoun County, concluding that Clark had failed to establish a prima
facie case of vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act. 8 Specifically,
16 Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss., 813 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (N.D. Miss. 1993).
Clark originally sued Calhoun County alleging violation of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. See Clark, 88 F.3d at 1395. Although the District Court dismissed
Clark's constitutional claims, Clark only appealed the Section 2 claim. Id.
17 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)
(emphasis added). In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act by changing
the language of § 2(a) and adding § 2(b), which provides a "results" test for
violation of § 2(a). Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1960. A violation exists if:
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this
section in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982)).
18 Clark, 813 F. Supp. at 1202. This article suggests that a prima facie case
satisfies the three Gingles preconditions. In Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752
(1986), The Supreme Court listed three preconditions for establishing a Section 2
violation: (1) "that [the minority group] is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single member district"; (2) "that [the
minority group] is politically cohesive"; and (3) "that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it... usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate." Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1961; Gingles, 106 S. Ct. at 2766-67. These
preconditions are necessary, but not sufficient to prove vote dilution. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b) (1982); Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1960. If these preconditions are established,
the minority group must further prove that under the totality of circumstances, they
do not possess the same opportunities to participate in the political process and
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the Court found that pursuant to Section 2, Clark failed to show that
a geographically compact black majority district could be created in
Calhoun County, and that vote dilution existed in light of the totality
of the circumstances. 9 Clark appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth
Circuit, not satisfied with the District Court's analysis, remanded the
case with instructions for the District Court to reconsider and explain
with respect to the totality of circumstances. 20
On remand, Clark submitted a proposed redistricting plan
regarding the feasibility of drawing a geographically compact
district." After reviewing the evidence, the District Court found that
a geographically compact black majority district could be created and
that racially polarized voting did exist in the county.22 Noting that
Clark had established a prima facie case of vote dilution under the
Voting Rights Act, the Court reconsidered its findings regarding the
totality of the circumstances.' Ignoring the Fifth Circuit's request for
explanation with "particularity," the Court confirmed its previous
findings and concluded that Clark, again, failed to prove vote dilution
under the totality of the circumstances.24 Once more, Clark appealed
the District Court's judgment. 5
The second appeal to the Fifth Circuit proved to be more fruitful
for Clark than the first. The Fifth Circuit found the District Court's
second opinion to be "far from the particularized explanation [the
Circuit Court] expected."26 The Fifth Circuit also stated that although
"we would [normally] remand this case for further consideration..
. we need not do so where the record establishes unlawful vote
elect representatives of their choice enjoyed by other voters. See 42 U.S.C. §
1973(b) (1982); Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1960; Clark, 88 F.3d at 1398.
19 Clark, 813 F. Supp. at 1202. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
20 Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss., 21 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
21 Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss., 881 F. Supp. 252,254 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
2 Id.
23 id.
24 Id. at 256.
25 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1395.
26 Id. at 1396.
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dilution."'27 The Court then discussed the record, concluding that
considering the totality of the circumstances, vote dilution existed in
Calhoun County.28
In addition to finding vote dilution, the Fifth Circuit addressed
a second issue: whether a state could avoid a violation, or remedy a
found violation of the Voting Rights Act by implementing race-based
affirmative action in the state's redistricting.29 Calhoun County
argued that "racial considerations dominated the drawing of [Clark's]
proposed district" and the proposals, therefore, violated the Equal
Protection Clause.30 Although the Fifth Circuit felt the County's
argument had "more bite than might appear at first glance," 31 the
Circuit Court's analysis of two recent Supreme Court opinions found
that affirmative action in voter redistricting serves a compelling
interest. As a compelling interest, race-based redistricting used to
avoid or remedy a found violation of the Voting Rights Act will
survive strict scrutiny if a court finds that the scheme is narrowly
tailored.
Clark, therefore, addressed two issues: whether Calhoun
County's voter redistricting plan diluted the minority vote in violation
of the Voting Rights Act, and whether Clark's proposed race-based
redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause. On the first
issue, the Fifth Circuit held that Calhoun County's redistricting plan
did, in fact, dilute the minority vote in violation of the Voting Rights
Act.32 On the second issue, the Fifth Circuit held that the proposed
race-based redistricting plan was not ripe for review3 3 Although the
27 Id
28 The Fifth Circuit's discussion of the record is analyzed in Part III of this Note.




33 Id at 1407. Clark's proposed redistricting plan was created to establish one of
the elements in his vote dilution claim. See Clark, 21 F.3d at 95 (stating that
Clark's proposed districts were "simply presented to demonstrate that a
majority-black district is feasible in Calhoun County"). The Fifth Circuit noted that
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redistricting issue was not ripe, the Fifth Circuit's analysis of this
issue is extremely significant because it identifies a new compelling
interest.
II. CALHOUN COUNTY'S VOTER REDISTRICTING PLAN: VOTING
RIGHTS ACT VIOLATION?
Early in its decision, the Fifth Circuit noted that its review was
"hampered by the District Court's curt discussion regarding the
totality of the circumstances."'34 The Court found further remand
unnecessary because the record clearly established vote dilution. 5
The Fifth Circuit considered the vote dilution in Calhoun County to
be a result of the County's redistricting procedure, which violated
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act36 by denying or abridging the right
of its citizens to vote due to race or color.37
In analyzing Clark's claims, the Fifth Circuit first turned its
attention to the record. Because the District Court found that Clark
had established a prima facie case of vote dilution under the Voting
Rights Act,38 the Fifth Circuit focused its review on the totality of the
Calhoun County has primary jurisdiction over its electoral system. Clark, 88 F.3d
at 1407 (quoting Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. City of Westwego, 946
F.2d at 1109, 1124 (5th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Westwego III]), "It must be left to
that body to develop, in the first instance, a plan which will remedy the dilution of
the votes of the city's black citizens"). The Fifth Circuit reminded Calhoun County,
however, that if it failed to develop a remedial plan, the federal District Court
would. Id (citing Westwego II, 946 F.2d at 1124, "fail[ure] to develop such a plan
in a timely manner, or fail[ure] to develop a plan which fully remedies the current
vote dilution, the responsibility for devising a remedial plan will devolve onto the
federal district court").
34 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1396.
11 Id. (citing Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5, 71 F.3d 1382, 1390 (8th Cir.
1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1876 (1996)).
36 See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
31 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1401.
31 Clark, 881 F. Supp. at 254.
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circumstances.39 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Senate
Report accompanying the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights
Act40 which lists various factors used to analyze the totality of the
circumstances.4' Those factors include: (1) the extent of any history
of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that
touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to
vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; (2) the
extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state or
political subdivision has used unusually large election districts,
majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other
voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group; (4) if there is a candidate
slating process, whether the members of the minority group have
been denied access to that process; (5) the extent to which members
of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and
health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process; (6) whether political campaigns have been
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; and (7) the extent to
which members of the minority group have been elected to public
office in the jurisdiction.42
In analyzing Clark, the Fifth Circuit discussed five of the seven
factors listed in the Senate Report, and disregarded two.43 The Circuit
19 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1395.
40 Id at 1396.
4, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 849 (5th Cir.
1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994) [hereinafter LULAC]; see 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982).
42 LULAC, 999 F.2d at 849 n.22; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982).
41 The Fifth Circuit disregarded the following two factors: (1) the history of
voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; and (2) the extent
to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas
such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process. Clark, 88 F.3d at 1399. The Fifth Circuit found
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Court noted that the Senate Report does not require "that any
particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them
point one way or the other."44
First, the Fifth Circuit discussed the District Court's finding of
racially polarized voting in Calhoun County.45 The Circuit Court
that the District Court did not err in "disregarding the history of past discrimination
and socioeconomic disparity in Calhoun County." Id. In LULAC, the Fifth Circuit
explained that "while Congress has not insisted upon proof of a causal nexus
between socioeconomic status and depressed political participation, Congress did
not dispense With proof that participation in the political process is in fact
depressed among minority citizens." Id. (citing LULAC, 999 F.2d at 867; S.Rep.
417 at 29 n.114, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n.114). The Court held that
"proof of socioeconomic disparities and a history of discrimination 'without more'
did not suffice to establish the two Senate Report factors." Clark, 88 F.3d at 1399
(citing LULAC, 999 F.2d at 867).
" Clark, 88 F.3d at 1400 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45) (quoting Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,45 (1986)).
45 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1397. Racially polarized voting is evidenced by the tendency
among minorities and whites to support different candidates where the
accompanying losses by minority groups at the polls are somehow tied to race. See
LULAC, 999 F.2d at 850. The Fifth Circuit noted that the District Court, in its first
opinion, found that racially polarized voting existed in Calhoun County, but
discounted its importance due to the success of black candidates seeking election
to several municipal and county offices. Id. The District Court noted that black
residents had been elected to the board of aldermen in two predominately white
municipalities in the county and that one black resident, who ran unopposed, had
been elected election commissioner in one of the predominately white districts.
Clark, 813 F. Supp. at 1193. In Clark's first appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Court
concluded that the black electoral successes cited by the district court had "limited
relevance." Clark, 21 F.3d at 96. The Fifth Circuit explained that the election of
some black candidates does not negate a Section 2 claim and does not negate the
possibility of racially polarized voting, particularly when the election is unopposed.
Id The Court further explained that "exogenous elections-those not involving the
particular office at issue" have less probative value than elections involving the
specific office that is the subject of the litigation. Id. at 97. While it remanded the
case, the Fifth Circuit instructed the District Court to give greater weight to the
"virtual absence of black electoral success in county-wide elections as opposed to
their limited electoral success in municipal elections." Id. The District Court, on
remand, reaffirmed its finding of racially polarized voting but construed the Fifth
1997-1998
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found that the existence of racially polarized voting was "beyond
question."46 The Court stated that "[i]n addition to the
'uncontradicted' statistical evidence from the original trial," the
expert witness' analysis of four multiracial elections in Calhoun
County showed a "consistent relationship" between a voter's race and
voting preference in those elections.47 As an example, the Court noted
that "in the 1991 Democratic primary for Constable, the black
candidate received an estimated 71.6% of the black vote but only
7.8% of the white vote." While noting that the statistical evidence
was not conclusive,41 the Fifth Circuit stated that the record supported
"no other conclusion but that racially polarized voting exists in
Calhoun County"4 9 and that Calhoun County offered no other
explanation of the divergent voting patterns."
Second, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that in Calhoun County
"black citizen[s] have been unsuccessful in seeking public office."'
The Fifth Circuit was unswayed by evidence that black residents had
been elected as aldermen and Election Commissioner in Calhoun
County, finding the probative value of these electoral successes of
Circuit's instruction as an "invitation to find a section 2 violation simply because
plaintiffs have prevailed on the Gingles factors." Clark, 881 F. Supp. at 256; Clark,
88 F.3d at 1397. In response, the Fifth Circuit stated that "the existence of the three
Gingles preconditions is necessary but not sufficient to prove a § 2 violation," see
LULAC, 999 F.2d at 849, but noted that "the existence of racially polarized voting
and the extent to which minorities are elected to public office remain the two most
important factors considered in the totality-of-circumstances inquiry." Clark, 88
F.3d at 1397; see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15; Westwego 111, 946 F.2d 1109, 1122
(5th Cir. 1991).
46 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1397.
41 Id. Dr. Richard Engstrom, a Professor of Political Science at the University of
New Orleans, used both regression and homogenous precinct analysis to find the
"consistent relationship." Id.
48 See Clark, 21 F.3d at 96.
49 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1397.
1o Id. (citing Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995)).
51 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1397.
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"limited relevance."5 2 The Court noted that "the election of a few
minority candidates does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of
dilution of the black vote,"53 and stated:
these isolated victories, one of which occurred in a
race with no opponent, do not mitigate the force of the
[D]istrict [C]ourt's finding that "[i]n this century, no
black candidate has been elected in Calhoun County
as supervisor, justice court judge, constable, sheriff,
circuit clerk, chancery clerk, tax assessor,
superintendent of education, school board member,
coroner, county attorney, state senator, or state
representative. 4
In response, Calhoun County argued that few black residents had run
for county office.5 The Fifth Circuit, however, asserted that this
argument "overstate[d] the political reality, [because] since 1980
blacks have sought the positions of justice court judge, constable,
sheriff, and school board member."56 The Court questioned whether
black residents "possess the same opportunities to participate in the
political process" as do other resident voters.57 The Fifth Circuit
found that a claim of vote dilution was not precluded by the fact that
52 Id. (citing Clark, 21 F.3d at 96).
11 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1397 (citing S.Rep. No.417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n.115
(1982) (internal quotation omitted), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207
n.115; Gingles, 478 U.S. at 76; NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002,
1009 (2d Cir. 1995); Harvell v. Blytheville School Dist. # 5, 71 F.3d 1382, 1390
(8th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1876 (1996)).
11 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1397-98 (quoting Clark, 813 F. Supp. at 1193). The Fifth
Circuit noted that "there is no suggestion that this striking lack of electoral success
is due to low voter turnout or black support for non-minority candidates." Clark,
88 F.3d at 1398 (citing Alonzo v. City of Corpus Christi, 68 F.3d 944, 947 (5th Cir.
1995) (per curiam)).
55 See Clark, 88 F.3d at 1398.
56 Id. (citing Clark, 813 F. Supp. at 1193).
57 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1398.
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few, or even no, black citizens had sought public office in Calhoun
County.
58
The Fifth Circuit further discussed Calhoun County's majority
vote requirement with regard to the third Senate Report factor: "the
extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot
provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance
the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group."59 In
the District Court's original opinion, the Court found that a majority
vote requirement was not inherently discriminatory. The District
Court, however, acknowledged that abolishing the requirement might
increase the possibility of electoral success for black candidates. 0
The Fifth Circuit pointed out that: first, even if the majority vote
requirement was not "inherently discriminatory," Congress included
it as one factor in the totality of the circumstances inquiry;6 and
second, under certain circumstances, the majority vote requirement
"can operate to the detriment of minority voters" and negate their
political strength.62 For example, where more than two candidates run
for a particular office, the majority vote requirement ensures that no
candidate, if supported by only a minority of the population, will
succeed. "In the presence of racially polarized voting, the majority
vote requirement permits a white majority that scattered its votes
among several white candidates in a election to consolidate its
support behind the remaining white candidate in the run-off election,
" Id (citing Westwego Citizens For Better Government v. City of Westwego, 872
F.2d 1201, 1208 n.9 (5th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Westwego 1]). The Fifth Circuit
said that holding otherwise "would allow voting rights cases to be defeated at the
outset by the very barriers to political participation that Congress has sought to
remove." Clark, 88 F.3d at 1398 (quoting Westwego 1, 872 F.2d at 1208).
59 Id.
60 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1398.
61 Id. (stating that courts are not free to second-guess Congress' judgment
regarding a factor's importance).
62 Id. (citing Westwego 1M, 946 F.2d at 1113 n.4).
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thereby defeating the minority-supported candidate."'6 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit held that the lower court failed to give appropriate
consideration to the discriminatory nature of majority vote
requirements.
The Fifth Circuit suggested that a black minority loss during a
primary due to the scattering of white majority votes was more than
a mere theoretical possibility in Calhoun County.' The Court pointed
out at least one occasion where the majority vote requirement
operated to the detriment of black voters by preventing the
nomination of a black citizen as the Democratic candidate for
constable in Calhoun County.6" In the first primary, the black
candidate finished first among all candidates, while not receiving a
majority of the votes.16 In the run-off election, the black candidate
lost.67
In summation, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the presence of
racially polarized voting and the virtual absence of black elected
officials in county offices amounted to "striking evidence of vote
dilution" in Calhoun County.68 The Circuit Court was persuaded that,
under the totality of the circumstances, Clark had demonstrated a
Section 2 violation under the Voting Rights Act.69
63 Id. (citing Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 351 n.32 (E.D. La. 1983) (three
judge panel); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc)
(noting that majority vote requirement tends "to submerge a political or racial
minority"), aff'dsub nom., East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976) (per curiam)).
64 Id.
6' Id at 1398-99.
6 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1399 (noting that the rest of the candidates were white).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1398.
69 Id. at 1400.
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III. COULD A PROPOSED RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING PLAN BE
CONSTITUTIONAL? THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S PREDICTION AND
THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW COMPELLING INTEREST
The Fifth Circuit's thorough analysis of the race-based
redistricting issue uncovered the fact that race may be used as a
predominant factor in redistricting pursuant to two 1996 Supreme
Court plurality opinions (Bush and Shaw i1).70 In Bush, the Court
"struck down three [race-based] Congressional districts in Texas,"
and in Shaw II, "invalidated North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional
District," all as violative of the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause.7  Although these redistricting plans were found
unconstitutional, the language in these opinions signal the Supreme
Court's changed approach to affirmative action in redistricting. The
Fifth Circuit identified this new approach by recognizing that a
majority of the current Supreme Court Justices: (1) have added a new
compelling interest to the list of those which satisfy the first prong of
strict scrutiny; and (2) recognize that state-sponsored race-based
affirmative action programs in redistricting are not per se
unconstitutional. Either proposition should result in continued use of
race as a factor in redistricting.
The Supreme Court generally applies "strict scrutiny" to all
race-based affirmative action programs.72 The Fifth Circuit's first
conclusion that "race-based redistricting, even that done for remedial
70 Interestingly, Clark's reply brief to the Fifth Circuit states, "the defendants
made the same arguments to the District Court that they now make--contending
that the plaintiffs' [proposed districts] violated traditional districting principles. The
District Court did not credit or rely upon those arguments, and neither should this
Court." App.Rep.Brief@ 6, Clark v. Calhoun, 88 F.3d. 1393 (5th Cir. 1996). The
Fifth Circuit did not follow Clark's advice.
7' Clark 88 F.3d at 1404-05. In Bush, "[t]he three districts were the product of the
Texas legislature's effort to increase the number of majority-minority districts in
the State." Id. at 1404.
72 SeeAdarand, 515 U.S. at 220
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purposes, is subject to strict scrutiny" was, therefore, not surprising.73
Within the redistricting context, however, it is only when race is a
"predominant factor" motivating the State's redistricting decision that
strict scrutiny is triggered.74 The Fifth Circuit recognized that six75
13 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1405. The Fifth Circuit cited to Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995), an earlier redistricting case, which described the evils of race-based
redistricting, declaring that "'[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes,
may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further
from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues
to aspire."' Id at 2486 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)).
74 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1952. In Miller, the Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff
must prove:
either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and
demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative
purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the
legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters
within or without a particular district. To make this showing, a
plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional
race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to
compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or
communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial
considerations.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that:
Justice O'Connor added in her concurring opinion that this
standard was 'a demanding one,' requiring the plaintiff to show
that the legislature 'has relied on race in substantial disregard of
customary and traditional districting practices.' In those cases
where the plaintiff successfully proves that race was the
'predominant, overriding' consideration motivating the drawing
of district lines, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate
that its districting plan is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest.
Clark, 88 F.3d at 1403 (citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 928-29 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
71 In reference to the predominant factor test, Clark contains a misprint in footnote
2 which reads "[o]n this point, at least six Justices sided with Justice O'Connor's
view of the law." Clark, 88 F.3d at 1404 n.2 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit's
analysis within the footnote clearly shows that five Justices sided with Justice
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Supreme Court Justices agreed that whether a redistricting plan is
subject to strict scrutiny depends upon whether the plaintiff can prove
that race was a predominant factor in redistricting.76 Because Clark's
O'Connor's view of the law. Justices Kennedy (who reserved the question),
Thomas and Scalia did not subscribe to the predominant factor test in Bush.
76 The six Justices include Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Writing for Chief Justice Rehnquist and
herself, Justice O'Connor stated that:
[s]trict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is
performed with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to all
cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts ....
For strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove that other,
legitimate districting principles were "subordinated" to race. By
that, we mean that race must be 'the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's [redistricting] decision."
Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (citations omitted) (brackets in original opinion).
Although Justice Kennedy joined the plurality opinion in Bush, he explicitly
chose not to render an opinion on this issue. Kennedy stated,
the opinion that strict scrutiny would not apply to all cases of
intentional creation of majority-minority districts ... require
comment. [This opinion is] unnecessary to our decision .... I do
not consider these dicta to commit me to any position on the
question whether race is predominant whenever a State, in
redistricting, foreordains that one race be the majority in a
certain number of districts or in a certain part of the State.
Id at 1971 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer, stated that "the plurality reasonably concludes that race-conscious
redistricting is not always a form of 'discrimination' to which we should direct our
most skeptical eye." Id. at 1978 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). In
addition:
[t]his Court has never held that race-conscious state decision
making is impermissible in all circumstances. The threshold test
for the application of strict scrutiny as set forth in Miller
implicitly accepts this as true, concluding that strict scrutiny
applies not when race merely influences the districting process,
but only when the 'legislature subordinated traditional race-
neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations.'
Id. at 1977 n.8 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted). Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, stated that "not
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proposed race-based redistricting plan used race as a predominant
factor, the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that race-based redistricting,
remedial or otherwise, would be subjected to strict scrutiny was
correct.
77
Strict scrutiny requires the State to offer evidence to satisfy a
two-prong test.78 First, the State must offer evidence of a compelling
state interest.79 If a compelling interest is found, the State must then
offer proof that its redistricting scheme is "narrowly tailored."8" The
Fifth Circuit explored the Supreme Court's current stance on each
prong.
In addressing the first prong of this test, the Fifth Circuit
identified a new compelling interest--"compliance with § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act."'" The Fifth Circuit, however, advised that mere
intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act would not be sufficient
to classify the State's race-based redistricting as compelling. Instead,
the State must establish a "strong basis in evidence" for showing a
violation of Section 2.82 At least five Supreme Court Justices agreed
with the first, and six Justices agreed with the second, of the
propositions in Bush. 3
every intentional creation of a majority-minority district requires strict scrutiny."
Id. at 2003 (Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, J.J., dissenting).
77 See Clark, 88 F.3d at 1402, 1408 (stating that "[r]edistricting to remedy found
violations of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by definition employs race").
78 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 220.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1405.
82 Id at 1405-06 (stating that "the State must have a strong basis in evidence for
concluding that the three Gingles preconditions exist in order to claim that its
redistricting plan is reasonably necessary to comply with § 2").
83 With regard to the first issue, the five Justices included Justices O'Connor,
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O'Connor stated that "the state
interest in avoiding liability under VRA § 2 is compelling." Bush, 116 S. Ct. at
1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, echoed Justice O'Connor's adoption of the new compelling interest stating
that "a State has a compelling interest in complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights
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Act . . . ." Id. at 1989 (Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Justice
Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, offered greater context to the
Court's decision stating that:
[i]n each of today's cases, the Court expressly assumes that
avoiding a violation of the Voting Rights Act qualifies as a
sufficiently compelling government interest to satisfy the
requirements of strict scrutiny .... While the Court's decision
to assume this important point arguendo is no holding.... the
assumption itself is encouraging because it confirms the view
that the intentional creation of majority-minority districts is not
necessarily a violation of Shaw I,... and it indicates that the
Court does not intend to bring the Shaw cause of action to what
would be the cruelly ironic point of finding in the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (as amended) a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee . . . . Justice
O'Connor's separate opinion.., bears on each of these points
all the more emphatically, for her view that compliance with §
2 is (not just arguendo) a compelling state interest and her
statement of that position virtually insulate the Voting Rights
Act from jeopardy under Shaw as such.
Id. at 2007 (Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
On the second issue, the six Justices included Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O'Connor
writing for Chief Justice Rehnquist and herself, stated that "[i]f the State has a
'strong basis in evidence for concluding that creation of a majority-minority district
is reasonably necessary to comply with § 2, and the districting that is based on race
'substantially addresses the § 2 violation,' it satisfies strict scrutiny."' Id at 1960
(citations omitted). Writing separately, Justice O'Connor echoed this conclusion
in her Bush concurrence:
If a State has a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the
Gingles factors are present, it may create a majority-minority
district without awaiting judicial findings. Its 'strong basis in
evidence' need not take any particular form, although it cannot
simply rely on generalized assumptions about the prevalence of
racial bloc voting.
Id. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
pointed out that:
in order for compliance with § 2 to be a compelling interest, the
State must have a strong basis in the evidence for believing that
all three of the threshold conditions for a § 2 claim are met:
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In describing strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring requirement, the
Fifth Circuit stated that "a tailored response to a found violation" is
one which considers race at the expense of traditional political
concerns "no more than is reasonably necessary to remedy the
wrong." 4 The Court's definition was formulated from the Supreme
Court's definition in Bush. Justice O'Connor and seven other Justices
described this requirement as one which "substantially addresses the
§ 2 violation."85 The Court surmised that upon such a showing by
[F]irst, "that [the minority group] is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district"; second, "that it is politically cohesive"; and
third, "that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate."
Id. at 1971 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 29
(1993), quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer, stated that
[t]he plurality admits that a State retains "a limited degree of
leeway" in drawing a district to alleviate fears of § 2 liability.
.. , but if there is no independent constitutional duty to create
compact districts in the first place, and the Court suggests none,
there is no reason why noncompact districts should not be a
permissible method of avoiding violations of law. Because [the
districts in Bush] satisfy the State's compelling interest and do
so in a manner that uses racial considerations only in a way
reasonably designed to ensure such a satisfaction, I conclude
that the Districts are narrowly tailored.
Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1989-90 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
4 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406.
s The seven Justices included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O'Connor writing for
Chief Justice Rehnquist and herself, stated that "the district drawn in order to
satisfy § 2 must not subordinate traditional districting principles to race
substantially more than is 'reasonably necessary' to avoid § 2 liability." Bush, 116
S. Ct. at 1961. In Justice O'Connor's concurrence, she reiterated her stance on
narrow tailoring:
[I]f a State pursues [a] compelling interest by creating a district
1997-1998
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Calhoun County, race-based redistricting like the one proposed by
Clark would serve to remedy Calhoun County's found violation of
the Voting Rights Act.
The Court hinted, through its analysis of Bush and Shaw II, that
if Clark's proposed race-based redistricting plan had been ripe for
review by the Fifth Circuit, it would have been found constitutional.
The Court's analysis of these cases, therefore, uncovered a new
compelling interest, and recognized that state-sponsored race-based
affirmative action programs in redistricting are not per se
unconstitutional. Although Bush and Shaw !!were perceived by some
to prohibit race-based redistricting, 6 the Fifth Circuit's analysis of
these opinions leads to the opposite conclusion.
IV. "WATERED-DowN" STRICT SCRUTINY AS THE NEW TEST FOR
RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING
Because courts apply strict scrutiny to all state-sponsored, race-
based affirmative action programs, 7 the Fifth Circuit's conclusion to
that 'substantially addresses' the potential liability [under § 2].
• .and does not deviate substantially from a hypothetical
court-drawn § 2 district for predominantly racial reasons... its
districting plan will be deemed narrowly tailored." Id. at 1970
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy echoes this
requirement, stating that "[i]f a State has the assumed
compelling interest in avoiding § 2 liability, it still must tailor its
districts narrowly to serve that interest. [T]he districting that is
based on race [must] 'substantially addres[s] the § 2 violation."
Id. at 1971 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (brackets in original) (citation omitted).
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer contended that it was
applicable in Bush. Id at 1989-90 (Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer acknowledge the possibility.
See id. at 2008-09 (Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
86 See Garrett Epps, The Supremes Find a Theme; The Court Steers, WASH. POST,
July 7, 1996, at C01 ("In one of its major decisions this term, the Supreme Court
ruled 5-4 in the Bush v. Vera case that the Constitution prohibited the use of race
as the primary motivation in drawing the boundaries of congressional districts").
87 See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,220 (1995), supra note 5.
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apply strict scrutiny to Calhoun County's race-based redistricting is
not surprising.88 In fact, the Fifth Circuit applied the same strict
scrutiny analysis to Calhoun County's redistricting plan that the
Supreme Court applied to the redistricting plans in Bush and Shaw .
The following analysis reveals, however, that the majority of the
Supreme Court Justices did not apply traditional strict scrutiny in
Bush and Shaw 1, but instead applied "watered-down" strict scrutiny.
A. "Watered-Down" Strict Scrutiny Defined
Strict Scrutiny is "watered-down" by not requiring the State to
prove that its redistricting scheme is "narrowly tailored" in the
traditional sense (i.e., the least burdensome alternative), but instead
merely requiring proof that the burdens are "no more than is
reasonably necessary to remedy the wrong." 89 The difference, while
subtle, is significant. ' Amidst speculation regarding reasons for this
change, Bush and Shaw H1 provide no clear answer. What is clear is
that the majority of the Supreme Court has adopted this approach
with regard to race-based voter redistricting.9' To disprove a claim
that the difference in Supreme Court language is merely semantic, it
is necessary to consider Justice O'Connor's description of strict
scrutiny in prior affirmative action cases. This underscores the fact
that the Supreme Court Justices intentionally created a standard
different from traditional strict scrutiny.
88 Clark, 88 F.3d at 1405.
99 Id. at 1406.
91 The difference is significant because the Court's "watered-down" strict scrutiny
does not fall to the level of intermediate scrutiny, which evaluates state action on
whether it is "'substantially related' to the achievement of an 'important
governmental objective."' See Adarand 515 U.S. at 220 (citing Regents of Univ.
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 518-19 (1978)).
9' See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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1. Through the Eyes of Justice O'Connor: The Historic
Disapproval of "Watered-Down" Strict Scrutiny
In 1987, the Supreme Court in United States v. Paradise92
upheld a decree requiring that fifty percent of promotions to corporal
in the Alabama State Troopers be allotted to blacks until they
comprised twenty-five percent of that rank.93 This remedy was
instituted to redress four decades of egregious discrimination and was
found to satisfy the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny.94 The
majority purported to apply strict scrutiny in ascertaining whether
Alabama's promotion practice was valid under the Equal Protection
Clause,9" but indicated that the least restrictive alternative was not
required for remedial classification plans.96 The Court emphasized
that choosing an appropriate remedy was a balancing process which
the trial court was suited to administer in its sound discretion, if
exercised within constitutional and statutory limitations. 7 Because no
single remedy was universally applicable, however, each of the
remedial classification plans must be evaluated in light of the
particular circumstances and options available in the given case.98
The Court stated that "[w]hile a remedy must be narrowly tailored,
that requirement does not operate to remove all discretion from the
District Court in its construction of a remedial decree." 99
Responding to the Court's application of a "watered-down"
strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor dissented.' This scathing dissent
illustrated her disapproval of watered-down strict scrutiny in an
affirmative action context: "The plurality today purports to apply
92 480 U.S. 153, 153-154 (1987).
93 Id. at 153-54.
94 Id at 166.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 184.
97 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 184.
98 Id.
99 Id
"o Id. at 195, 197 (O'Connor, Rehnquist & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
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strict scrutiny, and concludes that the [remedial measure] was
narrowly tailored for its remedial purpose. Because the Court adopts
a standardless view of 'narrowly tailored'far less stringent than that
required by strict scrutiny, I dissent."'' She stated that in order "to
survive strict scrutiny, the District Court order must fit with greater
precision than any alternative remedy."'
10 2
Two years after her Paradise dissent, Justice O'Connor wrote
the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Richmond v. JA. Croson
Co.,103 where she reiterated her disapproval of "watered-down" strict
scrutiny with regard to affirmative action: "The dissent's
watered-down version of equal protection review'04 effectively
assures that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the
'ultimate goal' of 'eliminat[ing] entirely from governmental decision
101 Id. at 197 (O'Connor, Rehnquist & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
102 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 199 (O'Connor, Rehnquist & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
103 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476 (1989). The Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action
by state and local governments. Id. at 731.
4 Id at 494 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor strongly disagreed with Justice
Marshall's watered-down strict scrutiny approach and stated that:
[u]nder the standard proposed by Justice Marshall's dissent,
'race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial
goals,' ... are forthwith subject to a relaxed standard of review.
How the dissent arrives at the legal conclusion that a racial
classification is 'designed to further remedial goals,' without
first engaging in an examination of the factual basis for its
enactment and the nexus between its scope and that factual basis,
we are not told. However, once the 'remedial' conclusion is
reached, the dissent's standard is singularly deferential, and
bears little resemblance to the close examination of legislative
purpose we have engaged in when reviewing classifications
based either on race or gender.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 494-95.
See, also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) ("[T]he mere
recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme").
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making such irrelevant factors as a human being's race' will never be
achieved."' 5
In 1995, eight years after Paradise, Justice O'Connor delivered
the opinion for the Court in Adarand v. Pena."6 Emphasizing the
Court's strict scrutiny of affirmative action, Justice O'Connor stated
that the Court's cases through Croson established a variety of
propositions with respect to governmental racial classifications.0 7
The most pertinent proposition identified by Justice O'Connor was
that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must
necessarily receive a most searching examination."'08 Clearly, Justice
O'Connor was applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action cases
through 1995.
105 Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
,o6 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204. In Adarand, the Court considered a disappointed
bidder's Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to a federal subcontractor
compensation clause that gave preferential hiring to minority subcontractors. Id.
The Court held that all racial classifications imposed by whatever federal, state or
local governmental actor, must be analyzed by the reviewing court under strict
scrutiny analysis. Id. at 220.
107 Id. at 223-24 (stating:
the Court's cases through Croson had established three general
propositions with respect to governmental racial classifications. First,
skepticism: [a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must
necessarily receive a most searching exnination, . . . [s]econd,
consistency: the standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause-is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by
a particular classification .... [a]nd third, congruence: [e]qual
protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Taken together, these three
propositions lead to the conclusion that any person, of whatever race,
has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the
Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.




2. The Supreme Court's Recent Adoption of "Watered-
Down" Strict Scrutiny-A Significant Change
After eight years of endorsing strict scrutiny and chastising
watered-down strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor apparently changed
her position with regard to affirmative action race-based redistricting.
Writing for the plurality in Bush, O'Connor stated:
If the State has a "strong basis in evidence," for
concluding that creation of a majority-minority
district is reasonably necessary to comply with § 2,
and the districting that is based on race "substantially
addresses the § 2 violation," it satisfies strict scrutiny.
We thus reject, as impossibly stringent, the District
Court's view of the narrow tailoring requirement, that
"a district must have the least possible amount of
irregularity in shape, making allowances for
traditional districting criteria."1"9
In other words, the "narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny
allows the States a limited degree of leeway in furthering such
interests."" 0 Justice O'Connor and the current majority of the
Supreme Court have thus regressed from strict scrutiny to the
"watered-down" strict scrutiny she called "standardless" and "far less
stringent" in Paradise."I
Of the seven Justices who adopted "watered-down" strict
scrutiny, clearly Justice O'Connor is the most surprising. Her
adoption of "watered-down" strict scrutiny after eight years of clearly
applying strict scrutiny is significant for two reasons. First, in writing
the Bush plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor and those Justices
joining her clearly appreciated the difference between strict scrutiny
109 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1960 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
10 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 196 (O'Connor, Rehnquist and Scalia, JJ.,
dissenting).
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and "watered-down" strict scrutiny. Second, the effect of the majority
of the Justices' adoption of "watered-down" strict scrutiny is that the
level of proof required for States to meet the "narrow tailoring" prong
of strict scrutiny will be lowered.
B. Speculation on Why the Supreme Court Lowered Its
Scrutiny Toward Race-Based Redistricting
Coupled with the Supreme Court's move to "watered-down"
strict scrutiny of race-based redistricting, the Fifth Circuit's analysis
apparently places the stamp of constitutional approval on the use of
race-based factors in voter redistricting without fear of the district's
unconstitutionality. Why would the Supreme Court decide to allow
the State greater flexibility in redistricting cases? A definite answer
is not found in the Supreme Court's opinions. One plausible
explanation lies in the distinction between fundamental rights cases
in which courts require state actors to apply the least restrictive
alternative, and remedial classification cases where the courts do not.
In fundamental rights cases, the court seeks to ensure that a clearly
identified constitutional right such as the right to vote is not
compromised in favor of a compelling state interest in, for example,
ensuring that voters are knowledgeable." 2 In these cases, the right to
vote clearly takes precedence, and any other effective way of serving
the state's interest should be utilized before restrictions are permitted
to be placed on exercise of the fundamental right."3 On the other
hand, in remedial classification cases, both interests are of a
constitutional dimension." 4 These competing interests, therefore,
should be balanced."' In other words, it would seem inappropriate
that the rights of "innocent" third parties should be viewed as
112 Solomon Oliver, Jr., Litigating The Constitutionality of State and Local






fundamental rights, requiring that no alternative should be able to
affect those interests except as a last resort.116 Furthermore, the least
restrictive alternative standard implies that only one alternative is
appropriate in a given situation." 7 Due to the complex factors and
considerations involved, however, it is impossible to determine a
remedy with mathematical precision."' The Court, therefore, should
uphold the exercise of discretion by legislatures charged with
decision-making, provided that the decision was premised on a sound
basis and relevant alternatives were canvassed." 9
This distinction is helpful in discerning the Supreme Court's
rationale for lowering the level of scrutiny applied to race-based voter
redistricting. Although the Court's actual reasoning for adding a new
compelling interest and lowering the level of scrutiny may remain
hazy, these actions should ensure continued use of race as a factor in
voter redistricting.
V. CONCLUSION
In Clark, the Fifth Circuit held that Calhoun County's
redistricting plan violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 2 0 The
Court reached this conclusion by combining the District Court's
finding that Clark had established a prima facie case of vote dilution,
with the Fifth Circuit's finding that under the totality of the
circumstances Clark had demonstrated a Section 2 violation under the
Voting Rights Act.'2 ' Although the Fifth Circuit found that Clark's
proposed race-based redistricting plan was not ripe for review, the
Court suggested that if it had been ripe, it would have been found
constitutional. The Fifth Circuit's analysis of Bush and Shaw 1H
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121 Id.
1997-1998
158 IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST VOL. XVI
uncovered a new compelling interest while recognizing that state-
sponsored, race-based affirmative action programs in redistricting
will not always be found unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit's
findings and the Supreme Court's recent move to "watered-down"
strict scrutiny should ensure continued use of race as a factor in voter
redistricting.
